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Getting the Message Across for Safer Self-Recovery in Post-
Disaster Shelter 
Charles Parrack, Bill Flinn, Megan Passey 
Abstract 
Self-recovery in post-disaster shelter is not the exception but the norm. Following earthquake, flood 
or storm, the majority of affected families will inevitably rebuild their homes themselves, using their 
own resources, but there is little support from the international community to encourage good safe 
building practice. 
          While the communication of key messages about safer building has been carried out effectively 
in development contexts, it rarely forms a major part of humanitarian response programming. If the 
humanitarian shelter sector is committed to the principles of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), more can 
be done to support the process of safer reconstruction among self-rebuilders. 
          This paper argues the case for the humanitarian community to link post-disaster shelter 
programming with the more developmental approach of communicating building safety to a much 
wider audience than just the most vulnerable beneficiaries. It proposes the shelter sector and the 
donor community direct more resources towards support for this process, which it argues would 
augment the effectiveness and impact of a shelter response. 
Key Words: self-rebuilding, building for safety, post-disaster reconstruction, post-disaster shelter, 
early recovery  
INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with promoting safer reconstruction amongst families rebuilding their 
homes after a natural disaster.  “Safety” refers to building techniques and practice that make 
buildings more able to resist hazards such as flood, earthquake and severe storm. As the focus is on 
safer construction, the list of hazards does not include those better dealt with by site selection and 
planning such as landslide, fire and volcano.  
 Self-recovery can imply self-build but also can also include rebuilding using the local informal 
building sector. Either way, households rebuild or repair damaged or destroyed homes using their 
own assets. Assets can be savings, materials (salvaged, donated or owned), social and community 
assets, local skills and labour. Increasingly, remittances from family members living abroad are an 
important asset.1  
          Faced with the impossibility of providing shelter assistance to all families post-disaster, 
beneficiary selection is often tailored to assist the most vulnerable. An unintended consequence can 
be that the majority who self-build incorporate the same bad building practice that caused their 
1 According to the 2013 Multilateral Investment Fund report on Remittances to Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Maldonado and Hayem, 2013) “almost USD$2 billion flowed into Haiti in the form of remittances 
in 2012 
home to be damaged in the first place. The recent disasters in Haiti and the Philippines both provide 
ample examples of construction that ignores best practice and simple safety features. 
          This paper investigates the level of engagement of the humanitarian community with self-
rebuilders and addresses risk management in this process. With reference to recent responses, it 
explores and analyses shelter programmes that include the promotion of messages about safer 
building to self-rebuilders, and presents the case for a change of emphasis that will increase the 
impact and effectiveness of a humanitarian response. 
THE CASE FOR SUPPORTING SELF-RECOVERY 
There are two particularly compelling arguments for supporting self-recovery: first, it is evident that 
the majority of houses destroyed by storm, flood or earthquake are re-built by the families 
themselves using their own resources; and second, if the international response continues with 
conventional product-based responses such as transitional and permanent shelter, it will not meet a 
significant proportion of the need with a solution that is long term, high quality and safe. Neither 
realisation is new, as pointed out by Ian Davis over 30 years ago: “... the vast majority of all low 
income small dwellings are owner built within the ‘informal sector’, and are likely to remain so, we 
have to ask what impact can be made on future housing” (Davis, 1981); and by the 2011 
Humanitarian Emergency Response Review:  “Providing adequate shelter is one of the most 
intractable problems in humanitarian response” (Ashdown, 2011).  In very stark terms, this implies 
that many houses built after an earthquake, storm or flood incorporate the same inadequate 
building practices that caused so much death, injury and economic damage in the first place. 
          The strongest case for supporting self-recovery is the recognition that it is an inevitable 
process.  A discussion of the scale and complexity of shelter responses is continued below, but the 
assertion can be illustrated and explained using the 2010 Haiti earthquake as an example. The 
shelter practitioner standing amongst the rubble of Port-au-Prince a few weeks after the earthquake 
could have pointed out, with some degree of certainty, that the majority of the city’s houses would 
be rebuilt by the Haitian informal sector and would be made from stone, reinforced concrete and 
hollow concrete blocks. Despite the subsequent efforts of engineers, architects and donors the 
prediction proves to be correct2. The exposition of over 60 designer houses at Zoranje on the 
outskirts of Port-au-Prince is an embarrassment of empty and inappropriate one-off prototypes that 
was opened with great fanfare and supported by the Bill Clinton Foundation. Intended as a 
demonstration site, a kind of marketplace for housing solutions, it remains a folly of unsuitable (and 
empty) homes. Another example of inappropriate housing is the nearby Morne a Cabri, a site of 
3,000 identical concrete cubes that appear to have been built without consideration of basic 
services, employment opportunities or transport links. By comparison it was estimated by mid-2012 
that 130,000 permanent homes had been rebuilt by Haitians themselves.   
          The international community did provide, over three years, around 113,000 temporary homes 
(referred to as t-shelters) for destitute families (IFRC, 2011). This is no small feat under the 
circumstances as materials had to be imported, land secured, designs approved, beneficiary families 
identified and contracts awarded. The fact remains, however, that these one-room buildings have a 
life span of three to five years and cost on average over US$4,000 each (Beunza and Eresta, 2011). 
Many were built to very low construction and engineering standards that would not withstand 
hurricane-force storms. These buildings, as they deteriorate, will either be replaced by owner-built 
houses or will be extended and patched-up to become sub-standard and potentially dangerous 
permanent homes.  Rather than a problem solved, this is a problem postponed. It will be the owners 
2 Some observers, for example Thummarukudy (2010), have pointed out that the inhabitants of Port-au-Prince 
initially were understandably reluctant to return to concrete homes for fear of another earthquake. This does not 
detract from the argument except to underline that in the world of post-disaster housing reconstruction nothing 
can be taken for granted. 
themselves, relying on their own resources, who will rebuild these t-shelters with little or no 
guidance on building more safely. 
          Haiti illustrates many of the problems facing humanitarian intervention. The earthquake killed 
in the region of 200,000 people and destroyed or damaged as many as 375,000 houses in the capital 
city of the poorest country in the hemisphere. It also wrecked the already weak government 
institutions. While the Haitian example is particularly extreme, every disaster is unique and direct 
comparisons are hard to find. Despite this, a brief overview of shelter responses from several recent 
disasters (see table) illustrates that the inability of the international community to make an impact 
on overall shelter needs within the first year is the norm and not the exception.  
Shelter Needs and Shelter Response for some Recent Emergencies
Emergency Name, 
Date 
Description No. 
households 
with shelter 
needs 
No. of 
transitional/ 
permanent 
shelters built 
within 1 year  
% Shelter needs 
met with 
transitional or 
permanent 
shelter  
Haiti Earthquake, 
January 2010 
Around 3.5 million people were affected by the 7.0 
magnitude earthquake that struck Haiti’s capital Port-
au-Prince in January 2010. The epicentre was a 
densely populated urban area with poor quality housing. 
Much of this was severely damaged or destroyed and 
1.5 million people were left homeless. 
The emergency shelter response was swift, and there 
was an extensive distribution of tarpaulins within 4 
months. The reconstruction phase however was much 
slower and out of a palette of available options, many 
agencies opted for transitional shelters. By July 2013, 
more than three years later, an estimated 113,315 
transitional and permanent shelters had been delivered, 
reaching approximately 30% of those with shelter 
needs.  
(IFRC, 2011); (Shelter Cluster, 2013)
375,000 39,219 10.4% 
Cyclone Sidr, 
Bangladesh, 
November 2007 
The number of homes damaged by cyclone Sidr was 
four times greater than the number of homes affected 
by the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, leaving almost 1.5 
million households without shelter. Less than five 
months later, a joint government and United Nations 
assessment estimated that three quarters of these 
families had begun to rebuild on their own with no 
external assistance. Shelter Cluster members voiced 
1,470,419 14,200 < 1% 
fears that without technical assistance, these families 
were replicating the same unsafe building techniques. 
By May 2009 the cluster reported that 14,200 
transitional and permanent shelters had been 
completed. These met less than 1% of the total shelter 
need and reached only around 4% of the most 
vulnerable families considered incapable of rebuilding 
on their own. 
(Davidson, 2008) ; (Shelter Cluster, 2008)
Pakistan Floods, 
July-August 2010 
The widespread flooding in 2010 affected an estimated 
20 million people across 77 of Pakistan’s 137 provinces. 
As the damage was so widespread and the floodwaters 
slow to recede in some areas, the Shelter Cluster 
suggested a nuanced approach to permanent and 
transitional shelter: One Room Shelters for those who 
could return, and Transitional Shelters for those who 
could not. Within a year, 453,293 one room shelters and 
63,700 transitional shelters had been constructed, 
covering almost 30% of the total shelter need. 
Construction continued quickly, with an additional 
100,000 shelters completed before December 2011.  
(Pakistan Early Recovery Shelter Cluster, 2010); (Pakistan Early 
Recovery Cluster, 2011a) ; (Pakistan Early Recovery Cluster, 2011b) 
1,875,000 516,993 27.5 % 
El Salvador Floods 
and Landslides, 
October & 
November 2009 
Tropical Depression 12-E caused heavy rainfall and 
storms in October and November 2009, which led to 
extensive flooding and landslides in El Salvador. An 
estimated 300,000 people were affected and thousands 
of homes damaged or destroyed. The Shelter Cluster 
was activated for only a three month period, November 
to January, during which it agreed on a model for 
temporary housing and was able to deliver over 1,000 
units. By the time the Shelter Cluster handed over to the 
government of El Salvador in January 2010, over 55% 
2,350 >1,310 
by Jan 2010 
>55.7% 
by Jan 2010 
of households with shelter needs had received one of 
these temporary shelters. However, the construction of 
permanent homes took much longer and the first of 
these were not completed until May 2010. 
(Beúnza, 2011) 
Cyclone Nargis, 
Myanmar, May 
2008 
An estimated 2.4 million people were affected by 
Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 and 1.4 million left 
homeless. The initial emergency shelter response 
prioritised the delivery of plastic sheeting, which was 
provided to 53% of affected households within two 
months. The recovery phase focused on both shelter 
construction and repair. In addition to the 13,000 
transitional and permanent shelters constructed within 
one year, repairs had been carried out on an estimated 
30,000 damaged homes. 
(Emergency Shelter Cluster, 2008), (Alexander, 2009); (Shelter Cluster, 
2009)  
450,000  13,000 2.8% 
 
 
 
The percentage figures in each of the examples show that humanitarian organisations rarely reach 
more than thirty percent of the shelter needs within the first year after a major disaster, and some 
significantly lower, with single figures not uncommon. The vast majority therefore cope on their 
own, either self-building or using their own resources to obtain the services of local builders and 
tradesmen. The total figures show that the task of rebuilding to meet all shelter needs, or even a 
significant proportion of them, is well beyond the capacity of the aid community.3 What is not 
considered is whether messages about safer building are transmitted by agencies or received by 
beneficiaries. Since this is rarely measured, the lack of data makes it difficult to assess and is a 
limitation of this paper. We recommend that further research be carried out to determine the 
degree and efficacy with which messages on safer reconstruction are communicated to self-
rebuilders.  
          The scale of the problem makes the task of building back safer, or making a significant impact 
on the safety of post-disaster self-recovery, seem challenging. The evidence shows that the task is 
likely to become more demanding. The number of climate related disasters (floods, storms and 
droughts) is steadily increasing. Since 1980, the number of floods has almost quadrupled and the 
number of storms has doubled (UNDSR, 2012). While the number of earthquakes remains constant, 
the number of quakes with significant death tolls has been increasing over the past centuries as 
population increases, cities expand and building materials become more dangerous. Earthquakes 
that will kill more than 10,000 people can now be expected to occur sixty times a century – more 
than one every other year.4 
          Most families rebuild using their own resources and this is the central reason for trying to shift 
the emphasis towards supporting the process of self-recovery. However there are several other 
advantages that should be persuasive.  Professor Ian Davis (2013) paraphrases the late Otto 
Koenigsberger, professor of the Development Planning Unit at University College London, by saying 
that “relief is the enemy of recovery”. Davis expands on this to explain that we should avoid doing 
anything best left to the house owner, avoiding paternalism and dependence. The second guiding 
principle of the World Bank/GFDRR Safer Homes, Stronger Communities states: “reconstruction 
begins the day of the disaster. If traditional construction methods need to change to improve 
building safety, governments must be prepared to act quickly to establish norms and provide 
training. Otherwise, reconstructed housing will be no less vulnerable to future disasters than what 
was there before. ....Owners are almost always the best managers of their own housing 
reconstruction”(Jha et al., 2010). It is possible that aid, or the promise of aid, can delay the 
commencement of reconstruction. On the other hand support for self-recovery can start very 
quickly while any NGO-driven construction project has a long lead-in time while designs are agreed, 
land tenure assured, materials procured and builders contracted. This has never been more evident 
than in the recent Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (November 2013). Filipino families began clean-
up and reconstruction immediately. At the time of writing, it is too soon to know if the shelter sector 
can respond effectively and rapidly to support families in rebuilding more safely. 
          Clinton (2006) provided ten defining propositions that led to an increase in ‘build back better’ 
initiatives and programmes after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Kennedy et al. (2008) point out the 
risks of misinterpreting the word ‘better’ which was understood by beneficiaries to mean masonry 
because it was modern and represented progress. Kennedy and his co-authors proposed renaming 
the initiative ‘Build Back Safer’ to avoid confusion and reflect more accurately what the principles 
were designed to support. 
          Risk management is an understandable concern for NGOs undertaking shelter programmes. 
The appeal launched after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 raised a quantity of money unequalled 
before or since. Agencies with no previous experience of shelter and no internal capacity took on 
3 To put this in perspective, the entire UK building industry built some 108,000 houses in 2012. (Department 
for Communities and Local Government 2013) 
4 Information from Dr John Elliott, Department of Earth Sciences, Oxford University (Elliott, 2011) 
                                                 
substantial housing programmes. Many got their fingers burnt and the spectre of the tsunami still 
casts a shadow over the shelter community. Houses had to be rebuilt or strengthened 
retrospectively because they were shown to be designed without taking the considerable seismic 
risk into account (Da Silva, 2010) Shelter has often been considered a risky undertaking; the tsunami 
exacerbated that belief. The difficulties experienced by INGOs working on post-tsunami projects 
were not unique: there are other examples of failed and troubled shelter projects (for example 
Saunders 2004, Sanderson, Sharma and Anderson, 2012) Although shelter is recognised as an 
essential human right and a key component of recovery, many NGOs understandably steer clear 
because of their own lack of experience and the evident risks. The danger of designing and building 
an inappropriate house is only one aspect of risk: the house could also be badly engineered or badly 
constructed; it could be built on illegal land; it could be built on a site that subsequently floods. For 
others, the transitional shelter may be a more risk-free route. If the shelter is sub-standard, 
somewhat inadequate or under-engineered for the prevailing hazards, it does not matter quite so 
much because the building, after all, is only temporary.  
          By contrast, supporting self-recovery removes much of the risk from the compass of the relief 
agency and places it with the decision-maker, the house-owner. It is a fundamental of risk 
management that the risk should be borne by those best placed to do so, but this is often not the 
case in shelter programming. While it is incumbent on the NGO providing technical support to give 
good advice and to encourage safe practice in construction and choice of site, the ultimate decision 
rests with the family concerned. Frequently we are unable to support families that live on dangerous 
or illegal land but equally frequently those families have no choice: they don’t want to live there, 
they are probably aware of the dangers, but their circumstances allow for no other option. 
Supporting them in the construction of their own dwellings might help reduce the inherent danger. 
          An important caveat is due at this point. Supporting families in their own decisions about 
where and how to build does not remove a duty of care from the agency involved. Assisting families 
that live in precarious circumstances should never be seen as endorsing unsafe building on 
dangerous sites. However, creative ways need to be found to support the most at-risk families living 
in the most precarious conditions. Too often, for example as in the case of landless families living on 
government-owned kash land in Bangladesh, the most vulnerable are passed over because they are 
on unsafe or illegal sites. 
          A decision to support self-recovery does not preclude other forms of shelter assistance. A 
nuanced response might include some t-shelters where needed, some cash support for repair and 
rebuild, perhaps some rental support. Self-recovery can also overlap with owner-driven 
reconstruction programmes, community driven reconstruction, Build Back Better programmes and 
aided self-help programmes. A small construction programme of permanent houses for the most 
vulnerable families could form the training programme for local builders. As always each disaster has 
its own characteristics; no two are ever the same; and there are no simple answers. 
          Many international NGOs are now seeing cash transfer projects as an effective way of 
delivering relief to disaster affected families in a way that is speedy and efficient as well as 
supporting and stimulating local markets (for example Creti and Jaspars, 2006). A shelter programme 
that combines conditional cash transfer with support for self-recovery could result in rapid 
reconstruction as well as safer building practice. Cash transfer, training and technical support for 
building safety are obvious bed-fellows. Cash programmes coupled with technical support also 
enhance the family’s freedom to choose and direct the progress of recovery. A delightful example of 
this is a major international NGO’s cash transfer programme in West Sumatra following the 2009 
Padang earthquake. Three and a half thousand houses were built by the families themselves, each 
one different and tailored to their individual needs and means. The sense of pride is clear in the 
personal touches of each house, the well tended gardens and verandas (Ashmore, 2012). 
 
 
DO SHELTER PROGRAMMES SUPPORT SAFER SELF-RECOVERY? 
 
In the series of shelter case studies (Ashmore, 2008, 2010, 2012, & 2013) a total of 108 shelter 
projects are presented in four volumes: the most comprehensive collection of shelter case studies 
available in the sector. A survey of the case studies shows that while many include some element of 
DRR, only a minority demonstrate support for safer self-rebuilding as part of a shelter programme, 
and only one case study is concerned with communication and messaging as the central theme.  
          While many post-disaster shelter programmes have a building safety component, this is often 
very limited in scope with very few studies available to assess impact. Some exceptions are 
mentioned below, for which the dissemination of good building practice was a central pillar. 
          The first example is from Haiti where one of the many problems faced during reconstruction 
was the poor quality of locally available concrete blocks. Following the 2010 earthquake, Build 
Change invited suppliers in Port-au-Prince to participate in training on how to improve the quality of 
the building materials they produced. Participants were taught how to improve the compressive 
strength of the blocks through a range of different techniques. Some required no additional 
investment at all, such as mixing more thoroughly and prolonging the mechanical compression 
period. Other recommendations required some additional investment, such as adjusting the 
proportions of the materials in the mix and increasing curing time. Improvements in quality were 
considerable: after training, one supplier was able to increase the compressive strength of his blocks 
from 4 to 14.36 MPa, twice the minimum recommended strength for an earthquake zone. For this 
supplier, improved quality led to improved demand, allowing him to expand his business and 
increase production from 300 to 2,000 blocks per day (Build Change, 2012). 
          Larger scale examples of implementing programmes for building safety which have had an 
impact on self-rebuilders include the SEEDS Masons’ Association, founded in response to the Gujarat 
earthquake of 2001, which turned into an 800 member organisation organising peer to peer training 
(UNISDR, 2007). More recently the One Room Shelter programme in Pakistan, in response to the 
2010 floods trained over 200,000 people in safer building techniques (IOM Pakistan, 2014) 
          While still the exception rather than the norm, there are other examples in which the impact 
of safer building programmes has been assessed. An Education for Safe Building programme was run 
by a consortium of NGOs including Oxfam and Concern after an earthquake in Yemen in 1982. The 
project was run for three years, and half of the 638 affected villages were visited by a mobile unit 
providing training in safer construction. Almost a quarter of region’s builders, 820 in total, were 
trained. An evaluation found that 84% of the homes built by trainees used improved building 
techniques, despite the extra cost (Benson, Twigg and Myers, 2001).  
          In 2010, Development Workshop France (DWF) carried out an impact assessment to evaluate a 
typhoon damage prevention project in central Vietnam, implemented by DWF over a ten-year 
period. The study examined contemporary construction in five communes in Thua Thien Hue 
province, which is vulnerable to annual typhoons and flooding (Norton and Chantry, 2010). 
          DWF’s project activities included training local builders in safer construction techniques, 
raising awareness among families about the importance of prevention, and providing small loans for 
house strengthening. The assessment found that although many new homes remained vulnerable to 
floods and typhoons, there was a greater awareness of risk, and an increased use of safer 
construction methods in communes where DFW had worked for a long time. It concluded that 
households in these areas “tend to build their houses with stronger materials and better structures” 
compared to in areas where DFW had worked for fewer years or none at all. In general the study 
found that safe construction principles and techniques promoted by DWF had been applied 
"relatively widely" and were seen as effective methods of preventing typhoon damage by 
community members, builders and local government staff (Norton and Chantry, 2010). 
          The findings of this study highlight the importance of reinforcing messages about safer building 
over time—something very difficult to do in a post disaster context where humanitarian actors are 
unlikely to stay for long. Effective involvement of national authorities and development actors to 
support safer building initiatives in the long term is vital to ensure that messages, both post-disaster 
and developmental, are not forgotten. 
          These examples show that support for self-recovery is not new. Indeed, most agencies 
recognise the need to embed DRR into all their programmes including in those shelter projects that 
are dominated by construction. However there is a lack of evidence that efforts in training and 
communicating are having a significant impact on post-disaster recovery. The examples cited above 
demonstrate that some shelter programmes already contain elements of support for safer 
rebuilding. However, the extent of the success of these programmes is difficult to ascertain as there 
are few impact studies. The Development Workshop study suggests that support for safer self-
rebuilding can take many years to bear fruit. The challenge to the humanitarian shelter sector is to 
build on the work already done, particularly by developmental agencies, to find effective ways of 
promoting incremental improvements that will significantly improve the safety of houses built by 
self-builders or the informal sector. 
 
 
BUILDING FOR SAFETY OR SAFER BUILDING? 
 
Any improvements in building practice have to be affordable. They also need to make the structure 
significantly safer, and must take existing building practice as the point of departure. The concept of 
incremental improvement is based on what we know, or what we can assume with a high degree of 
certainty, will be the materials and techniques that families will employ as they begin to rebuild their 
homes. The shelter practitioner mentioned at the outset of this paper, standing in the rubble of 
Port-au-Prince, knew that the city would be rebuilt in masonry; if she was in Myanmar it might be 
timber; in rural Peru it would surely be adobe.  
          There is an important distinction to be made between “safe” and “safer”. Clearly the safer, the 
better, but some degrees of safety cannot be achieved. Designing against landslides and tsunamis is 
not feasible and the term “earthquake-proof” is unhelpful as well as un-achievable. In the realm of 
self-build, or building through the informal sector, where codes are not enforced and guidelines are 
simply guidelines and no more, then an argument has to be made for shifting the culture of building 
practice towards incremental changes that are easily understood and replicable and that make for 
safer buildings. Here we are mainly concerned with making houses that are less likely to cause 
death, injury or ruinous economic loss. To rebuild safer would be a great advance; to rebuild entirely 
safely remains an aspiration.  
          Any discussion on safer building practice has to happen alongside a debate about all aspects of 
appropriate design, especially the importance of a participatory process. There are examples of 
housing projects that may have been engineered to withstand a major earthquake but have been 
less than satisfactory to live in because they have not considered cultural appropriateness, comfort 
and adaptability (for example Sanderson, Sharma and Anderson, 2012).  
 
 
EXAMPLES OF SAFER BUILDING PRACTICE 
 
There are many simple and affordable ways in which small domestic buildings can be made safer. A 
few examples might help to appreciate the kind of improvements that can be simply communicated 
to homeowners and self builders in the informal sector. 
          One example is simplicity of design. It is not immediately apparent, for instance in an 
earthquake zone, why a building that is rectangular in plan is better than an L-shape, but this is a 
lesson that can be easily communicated and learnt. Another design detail to avoid is having the 
doorway immediately adjacent to a corner. It could also be an idea to consider two doors so that 
escaping from a building is easier. A building is stronger if the openings are in the long wall and 
avoided in the short wall. These are all design decisions that cost little or no money but can make a 
building safer. They are also simple messages to communicate. 
          In a timber frame building the hurricane strap is simple and cheap. This is a thin strip of metal 
nailed across a joint that makes it several times stronger than a normal nailed connection. The metal 
ties can be snipped from inexpensive galvanised metal sheet available the world over. This 
technique was widely adopted in the construction of transitional shelters in Haiti, but frequently 
applied incorrectly. A simple orientation on the correct application of hurricane strapping would 
have improved the strength of the shelters and avoided the time and money wasted in doing it 
wrong. 
          Most builders know that a ring beam is an important element in increasing the strength and 
safety of a concrete building. However its strength relies on the quality of the reinforced concrete. 
There are simple messages that can be communicated on the correct bending, tying and lapping of 
steel bars and the correct way to mix and pour concrete to avoid honeycombing (where the steel-
work is exposed and will rapidly corrode) and ensure strength and durability.  
          These are just three examples of safer building practice that can be communicated in a 
straightforward manner. Moreover, they show that these messages might fall into the categories of 
design, materials and skills. There are many others that are specific to context, hazard, local 
vernacular building typologies and indigenous skills. Other messages, such as the design principles 
mentioned above, can be considered to be general good building practice applicable in many 
circumstances. Currently there is a lack of consensus on the relative priority and impact of different 
good construction messages and a lack of methodologies for successful communication strategies. 
However there is a growing consensus that getting these messages across, and ensuring that they 
are implemented, is an important step towards improving building safety and improving the long-
term resilience of hazard-prone communities. 
 
 
CHALLENGES AND BARRIERS 
 
In this paper we argue for more emphasis on support for the inevitable process of self-recovery. 
There are several counter-arguments and by considering a few of them here we are recognising that 
they need to be carefully taken into account. Furthermore, no two disasters are ever the same and 
there are no blueprints or standard solutions. 
          There will always be a need to balance the immediate needs of homeless people with longer-
term support for recovery. The case for the t-shelter is that it bridges a gap between the emergency 
and recovery or reconstruction. By supporting self-builders in the construction of permanent homes 
we are open to the criticism of condemning families to longer in tents or t-shelters. There may be 
some truth in this – the construction of a permanent home is never a quick process – but it is also 
interesting to note that the cost of a permanent house is sometimes not that much higher than the 
cost of a temporary t-shelter (Davis, 2012). Transitional shelters do also have a habit of becoming 
post facto permanent, but sub-standard and unsafe. The provision of transitional shelters in large 
numbers is also very expensive and according to evidence from Haiti, the community itself does not 
necessarily put housing as the top priority (Rule, 2013)5. If infrastructure and livelihoods are restored 
then houses may naturally follow – and support for that self-build process, while still imperative, 
comes at a lower cost.  
          Changing the attitude of donors and international agencies is another challenge. As one shelter 
practitioner stated: “donors required concrete numbers of beneficiaries and shelters [which] doesn’t 
really promote the idea of working through a medium of information to assist the larger affected 
populations”. Donors like solutions that are easy to count and have a clear beneficiary list; trainings, 
5 The British Red Cross found that a Haitian community ranked housing ninth in order of priority. From a 
presentation by Amelia Rule, BRC, to the UK Shelter Forum September 2013 (Rule, 2013). 
                                                 
mass-messaging, and informal support to local builders are all difficult to clearly quantify. There may 
be a need for long term project support for safer self-rebuilding in order to make an impact, which 
may encounter funding and institutional support barriers. Undeniably, there is also a capacity and 
skills gap within the sector. The shelter practitioner with humanitarian experience, knowledge of 
effective communication techniques as well as sound construction and engineering skills is a rare 
breed in a world of increasing need. If effective communication of safer building strategies should 
become a key component in reconstruction programmes, the necessary skills will need to be 
encompassed by the practitioner or the shelter team. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout this paper we have referred to the “inevitable” process of self-recovery. We argue that 
this process requires the shelter sector and the donor community to redirect resources towards 
support for this process. Failing to do so has a consequence: it runs the risk that the post-disaster 
reconstruction of houses will incorporate the same unsafe practice that caused so much damage in 
the first instance. We show that current shelter practice, particularly in major disasters, rarely 
provides for the needs of the majority, sometimes covering less than ten percent of the housing loss 
within the first year. Furthermore, this is often in the form of temporary one-room shelters. 
Consequently we conclude that the majority of permanent dwellings are built using the owner’s own 
resources, either through self-build or using the informal building sector. This provides an 
opportunity, as well, arguably, as a moral obligation, to augment the effectiveness and impact of a 
shelter response through increased support for the process of self-recovery. This does not imply a 
complete volte face; all shelter responses are complex and varied and the process of improving 
safety as part of self-recovery fits well with cash transfers, livelihood programmes, integrated 
neighbourhood projects and so on. Communication of safer construction techniques can also 
complement t-shelter, one-room-shelter, prototype model houses and other construction projects. 
          We have illustrated some successful examples of communicating good practice in both 
development and humanitarian settings. However, our research also shows that these examples are 
few and far between and that there is little evidence to show the effectiveness and impact of 
messaging, training and awareness-raising in a post-disaster scenario. To increase this impact and 
engender an understanding of safe building good practice, there has to be an increase in the 
relevant skills within the sector and reliable access to good, technical information. 
          There is never a one-size-fits-all solution to shelter programming. However there is a strong 
case to be made for placing much more emphasis on increasing the safety of owner-built housing. 
This will have a significant impact on the lives of many by reducing their risk to future hazards and 
encouraging a change across the community towards safer building practice. 
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